Central to this work is my three-article dissertation entitled, “Strategy and Consequences of the ‘Broken’ Appointments Process.” In this project, I explore the consequences of the “broken” appointments process for presidential control over the administrative state and how presidents navigate this new reality. In three interconnected empirical chapters, I provide evidence for when vacancies, or periods in which no Senate-confirmed individual occupies an agency leadership position, are harmful to the president’s ability to influence administrative policymaking and when they empower presidential control. I also investigate how presidents assert control over vacancies in appointed positions through the use of acting officials, or individuals that temporarily assume leadership positions, and how those decisions affect the nomination and confirmation process.

Outside of my dissertation, I have several other projects related to executive branch politics and performance. One set of papers builds off my dissertation work by further studying the causes and consequences of the “broken” appointments process through vacancies. A final portion of my research agenda explores policymaking and representation across state bureaucracies.