Preaching to the Choir: Agency Composition and Unilateral Action Use

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Abstract

The increasing prevalence of vacancies in presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed (PAS) positions and the increased reliance of presidents on unilateral action are two notable features of the most recent presidential administrations. While extensive research has examined these trends in isolation, scholars have been slow to unpack the consequences of vacancies for unilateral action. This paper explains how vacancies affect the presidentâs decision to use executive orders and executive memoranda and how the effect of vacancies will be moderated under certain conditions. It evaluates its claims with new data on appointee vacancies and unilateral action, both executive orders and executive memoranda, during the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations. This analysis provides insight into the incentives and constraints presidents face when issuing unilateral action and the broader effects of vacancies on the administrative presidency.

1 Introduction

Preisdent Trump entered office having promised to "get rid of [the EPA] in almost every form" and to "end intrusive EPA regulations" (EPA 2016; Trump 2017; Washington Post 2017). To achieve these goals, Trump quickly nominated Scott Pruitt, Susan Bodine, and Andrew Wheeler to lead the agency (Washington Post 2020) and, over the course of his administration, he nearly tripled the number of appointees within the agency (Office of Personnel Management 2022). But the president's efforts to alter the agency's course of policymaking did not stop with the placement of appointees. Instead, the president issued a series of executive orders instructing the agency to overturn Obama-era policies and regulations (Baker 2020; Popovich, Albeck-Ripka, and Pierre-Louis 2021). Appointees within the agency worked to implement the president's directives, "speed[ing] up the administrative process, in an effort to suspend or overhaul environmental rules and replace them before January 2021" (Eilperin, Dennis, and Muyskens 2020). With both presidential directives and agency personnel to ensure those directives were implemented, the president was able to successfully "dismantle" climate and environmental policy at the agency (Popovich, Albeck-Ripka, and Pierre-Louis 2021).

With administrative agencies at the core of policymaking in the United States, presidents naturally seek to make agencies responsive to them (Moe 1985). Indeed, executives employ two primary strategies to control administrative policymaking–politicization and centralization (Moe 1985). Presidents politicize by selecting loyal appointees to head agencies (e.g., Lewis 2008). From their leadership positions, appointees direct policy implementation, select priorities, make budgetary decisions, and monitor civil servants (e.g., Moe 1985; Wood and Waterman 1991; Lewis 2008). Presidents centralize by pulling key policy decisions into the White House and inserting White House personnel in agency decision making (e.g., Bolton, Potter, and Thrower 2015). Unilateral action, or directives issued by the president to agencies, falls into this latter category, as they involve the White House providing direction to agencies on how to use their discretion in implementing the law.

Scholars have devoted considerable attention to the study of presidential appointments

and unilateral action in separate literatures (e.g., Howell 2004; Lewis 2008). However, scholars have not theoretically engaged with how internal agency dynamics constrain the president's use of unilateral action (Lowande and Rogowski 2021). In particular, existing theories do not explain how the presence of political appointees and the ideological composition of agencies affect the president's decision to issue unilateral action. Presidents do not truly act unilaterally. Instead, as Lowande and Rogowski argue, "every presidential directive is an order to an administrator" that must be complied with and implemented (2021, 27). Therefore, the level of control presidents have within the agency and the ideological disposition of agency personnel relative to the president are crucial to our understanding of the president's decision to use unilateral action. Further, understanding the relationship between appointees and unilateral action may offer insight into the tradeoffs presidents face between centralization and politicization (Rudalevige and Lewis 2007).

To advance our knowledge of the administrative presidency and to address these important limitations, we seek to answer the central research question: how does the political composition of an agency influence a president's decision to use a unilateral action? We explore how presidents rely on political appointees to ensure their directives are implemented. Further, we highlight that presidents are particularly cautious about issuing unilateral action to ideologically opposed agencies when they do not have appointees in place. In these instances, presidents are less willing to risk the potential for noncompliance.

To evaluate our expectations, we use new data on political appointees, vacancies, and unilateral action during the Clinton through Trump administration. A careful analysis of this data reveals that presidents are much less likely to issue unilateral action to ideologically opposed agencies when the head of the agency is vacant for longer periods. However, when an ideologically opposed agency is more highly politicized, the president is significantly more likely to issue unilateral action. These results suggest that presidents avoid risks of noncompliance by issuing fewer directives to agencies they have less control over. Further, they suggest that presidents face internal constraints on their use unilateral action beyond

those normally considered (e.g., via Congress and the public).

2   Theory

The executive branch is comprised of 15 executive departments containing hundreds executive agencies staffed by approximately 2 million civil servants with 4,000 appointed by the president, 1,200 of which require Senate confirmation. These individuals, and more broadly agencies, are responsible for implementing policy and enforcing the law. While the president is at the head of the executive branch, the bureaucracy is not merely a tool of the president. Agencies have their own cultures and preferences that do not always align with those of the president (Richardson, Clinton, and Lewis 2018; Potter 2019). When agencies preferences diverge from those of the president, agencies have a variety of ways to exert their own influence over agency outcomes (Potter 2019). Thus, the president can face internal resistance that dampens his ability to implement his agenda.

The president is not powerless in the face of bureaucratic drift. He has multiple strategies he can exercise to influence bureaucratic policymaking– centralization and politicization (Moe 1985). Centralization occurs when presidents bring key policy decisions into the White House and insert White House personnel into agency decision making (e.g. Bolton et al. 2015). While centralization is traditionally thought of as the White House's power to review agency actions, we may also think of centralization in terms of preemptive control over agency actions. Unilateral actions, including executive orders and executive memoranda, are directed to agencies from the White House instructing the implementation of policy or altering the structure or administrative practices of the bureaucracy (Cooper 2014). Thus, unilateral actions are one way the president can centralize.

While unilateral actions provide the president with increased power over the executive branch, they are costly to use. Specifically, formal directives, such as executive orders, require extensive review to ensure compliance with existing statutes and draw on expertise from the

executive branch in their creation (Rudalevidge 2021). Further, the president might face external costs when issuing unilateral actions from other political actors, such as Congress (e.g. Howell 2004; Chiou and Rothenberg 2014), or the public (e.g. Christenson and Kriner 2019). The president will not always want to incur the costs of using unilateral actions. Thus, we should expect the president to consider a number of factors when deciding whether to issue an unilateral action, one of which being the composition of the agency he is directing.

The politicization of an agency actively influences the composition of the agency. One of the key mechanisms by which all presidents assert control over the administrative state is by getting their people into leadership positions of executive agencies (Moe 1985; Lewis 2008). Lewis asserts this clearly: "of course, the presidentâs most important source of bureaucratic control is via personnel" (2008, 7). Appointees head agencies, direct policy implementation, select priorities, make budgetary decisions, and monitor civil servants (e.g., Moe 1985; Wood and Waterman 1991; Lewis 2008).

Although agency heads are an important asset to the president, the government has faced longer and more frequent periods of vacancies over time, exacerbated by increasing periods of delay and confirmation failure rates (O'Connell 2009, 2017; Dull and Roberts 2009; Resh, Hollibaugh, Roberts, and Dull 2021). With the traditional nomination and confirmation process made more demanding and less fruitful, confirmation is often only sought immediately for the most important positions (O'Connell 2009; Lewis and Richardson 2021). Presidents have increasingly left the remaining broad swath of PAS positions vacant for extended periods of time (O'Connell 2009; Resh et al. 2021). These persistent vacancies limit the president's control over the executive branch (O'Connell 2009; Bolton, Potter, and Thrower 2016).

When there are fewer presidential appointees in an agency, agencies become less responsive to the president as career civil servants are able to subvert presidential directions (O'Connell 2009; Bolton, Potter, and Thrower 2016; Potter 2019). Since unilateral action use is costly, the president will not want to expend precious resources directing unresponsive agencies via unilateral action. Instead, the president would rather direct unilateral actions to

highly politicized agencies where the president anticipates a higher likelihood of compliance (O'Connell 2009; Bolton, Potter, and Thrower 2016). Thus, the president should direct more unilateral actions to an agency as politicization increases and vacancies decrease.

Hypothesis 1: As presidential influence over personnel in an agency increases, the president will direct more unilateral actions to that agency.

While appointees provide presidents with greater control over agency policymaking, career civil servants within agencies have their own policy preferences and ideological predispositions. For example agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security are known to be home to more conservative employees, while other agencies, like the Environmental Protection Agency, are known to be more liberal. Knowing the ideological leaning of the agency, president anticipate more or less compliance from agencies depending on their alignment with him (Lewis 2008; Hollibaugh, Horton, and Lewis 2014). Agencies ideologically opposed to the president, when left to their own devises, will likely object to the president's policy agenda and be more likely to not comply with presidential directives. Therefore, presidents will be less willing to risk costly noncompliance when opposed agencies do not have appointees in place to lead implementation and conduct oversight of career employees. However, when presidents have more appointees in place, and thus more control, they will be more willing to direct unilateral action towards those agencies. Further, highly politicized agencies are more responsive to the president (Bolton, Potter, and Thrower 2015). Presidents can exert more control over ideologically opposed agencies through appointments (Lewis 2008). Unilateral actions also provide the president with control over agencies, however the president will only want to engage with agencies he believes will be responsive. While opposition agencies are less likely to comply with presidential directives, increasing the number of appointees can increase their likelihood of compliance. Thus, the president should direct more unilateral actions to opposition agencies as they become more politicized as a means of effectively controlling agencies with opposing preferences.

Hypothesis 2: As politicization increases, the president will issue more unilateral actions

to ideologically opposed agencies.

3   Data, Variables, and Methods

To test these hypotheses, we need a measure of presidential unilateral action use. While most of the extant literature focuses on presidential executive order use (e.g. Howell 2003; Mayer 2001), executive orders are not the only type of unilateral action. Recent studies have also begun considering executive memoranda, although these studies are limited to those memoranda published in the *Federal Register* (Lowande 2014). For our measure of unilateral actions, we have collected executive orders and published memoranda from the *Federal Register* and utilized the American Presidency Project's *Public Papers of the President* to collect unpublished memoranda.[1] We run the models on each type of unilateral action separately as these directives have a number of differences, including but not limited to whether they are required to be published in the *Federal Register*.[2]

Our theory is not concerned with the number of directives issued generally, but rather which agencies the unilateral actions are directed to. For executive memoranda, the agencies the memoranda is intended for is listed at the top of the document. In some cases, memoranda are directed to the "Heads of All Executive Departments and Agencies." These directives are not included in our data. For both published and unpublished memoranda, we count the number of memoranda directed to each cabinet department in a given year as well as those directed to the Office of Management and Budget, Office of Personnel Management, Environmental Protection Agency, Small Business Administration, and Social Security Administration. Unfortunately, the president does not explicitly list the agencies he is instructing with

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[1]Presidents do not direct unpublished memoranda to be published in the *Federal Register*. However, presidents will frequently make these memoranda public via the *Public Papers of the President*. Their publication in the *Public Papers* might occur months or years after the original issuance. In some cases, presidents publish all these documents at the end of their term (Cooper 2014).

[2]Executive orders and proclamations are legally required to be published in the Federal Register under the Federal Register Act of 1935. Proclamations are not included in this study as their intended audience is not the executive branch, but rather the public. Executive memoranda are not required to be published in the *Federal Register* hence the distinction between published and unpublished memoranda.

executive orders. For orders, we read the executive orders and identified the agencies being instructed by the order. If all cabinet departments were instructed by the order, then the order was excluded. The dependent variable is the number of executive orders, published memoranda, and unpublished memoranda directed to each cabinet department in a given year.

3.1 Independent Variables

To test the expectations above, we need measures of vacancies, politicization, and agency ideology. To measure vacancies, we used the length of time in days the PAS position leading the agency was vacant for each agency-year. For the period between 1993 and 2013, we used vacancy data collected by Resh et al. (2021). We then supplemented their data with information on confirmation dates from Senate.gov and exit dates from agency websites and other external sources (e.g., news sources, Leadership Connect).

We also include a measure for whether the agency head was in their first year in the agency. We code an agency-year with a 1 if the agency has a new leader in that year. It is likely that appointees are more able to exercise control over an agency's operations the longer that they are in their position. Therefore, this serves as another measure of presidential control via appointee placement.

To measure politicization, we calculated the percent of supervisors in an agency that were comprised of political appointees (Lewis 2008). For the period of 1993-1997, we relied on politicization data collected by Lewis (2008). We then gathered annual counts of agency supervisors and appointees from the Office of Personnel Management's *FedScope*.[3]

To measure ideological position in relation to the president, we use a measure of agency ideological reputation from the 2014 SFGS (Richardson et al. 2018). The authors asked agency officials: "In your opinion, do the policy views of the following agencies tend to

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[3]While Lewis' measure relies on the number of managers in the agency, the OPM measures relies on the number of supervisors. To ensure that differences between the measures do not bias our results, we also estimated models on the subset of years for which we rely on the OPM measure. Results, reported in the appendix, are substantively similar.

slant liberal, slant conservative, or neither consistently in both Democratic and Republican administrations?" (Richardson et al. 2018, p. 304). They aggregated responses and generated ratings, after accounting for each respondent's conception of the general liberal-conservative ideological dimension and the respondent's experience with the agency. The ratings vary from -2 to 2. We coded an agency as moderate if the estimate of the agency's ideology is statistically indistinguishable from 0. We coded an agency as liberal or conservative if the estimate of the agency's ideology is statistically distinguishable from 0 in either a liberal (negative) or conservative (positive) direction. We then code the "Ideological Opponent" variable with a 1 if the agency has an ideological reputation that is in opposition to the president (e.g., liberal agency-Republican president).

3.2   Control Variables

Of course, other factors are correlated with presidential use of unilateral action and the key independent variables. To account for potential confounders, we include agency, year, and presidential-level controls. To begin, we control for the agency's location in a Cabinet Department.[4] We code the "Department" variable with a 1 if the position is within a Cabinet Department bureau and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the comparison group is independent executive agencies (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Social Security Administration, etc.) or the Office of Management and Budget.[5]

Additionally, we include presidential fixed effects. It is possible that observations from one presidential administration are systematically different than in another administration.

Finally, we control for the partisan composition of the Senate relative to the president. We code the "Senate Opposition" variable with a 1 if the Senate was controlled by party

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[4]We might be concerned that the hypothesized relationships are systematically different for Cabinet departments, because of their size and importance to the president. Therefore, we also estimate models on the subset of observations from Cabinet departments. Results, reported in the appendix, are substantively similar.

[5]We might be concerned that there are other unobserved differences between agencies that are unaccounted for in our model specifications. Therefore, we also estimate models that include agency fixed effects. Results, reported in the appendix, are substantively similar.

in opposition to the president (e.g., Democratic president and Republican Senate). It is possible that Senate partisan alignment may affect both constraints on the president's use of unilateral action and the president's ability to get their appointee teams in place.

3.3   Methods

We estimate models to observe the determinants of presidential unilateral action. Since the dependent variable, number of each type of unilateral action directed towards an agency, is a count, we estimate negative binomial models. We estimate models with each independent variable of interest and with interactions with agency ideology. We discuss substantive results in terms of changes in the predicted number of unilateral actions.

4   Results and Discussion

Table 1 presents the results of the main model. When there is a new agency head, the president will direct significantly fewer executive orders and unpublished memoranda to the agency. This is consistent with our theory as the president worries about compliance more when an individual with less experience heads an agency. When interacting "new head" with whether an agency is ideologically opposed to the president, executive order use is no longer significant. Further, the president will issue significantly more unpublished memoranda to ideologically opposed agencies with a new head.

When we measure the composition using the length of a vacancy, unilateral action use is not significant. However, presidents do issue significantly fewer unilateral actions to ideologically opposed agencies as the length of vacancies increases. This finding supports our theory as presidents will anticipate less compliance from ideologically opposed agencies. Specifically, the president will expect ideologically opposed agencies with vacancies present for longer to be less responsive.

When considering our measure of politicization, we find that presidents do issue signifi-

cantly more executive orders and published memoranda to more politicized agencies. While the relationship for unpublished memoranda moves in the correct direction, the relationship is not significant. The president will issue even more executive orders to ideologically opposed agencies as they become more politicized, which supports our second hypothesis. However, ideologically opposed agencies do not receive significantly more published or unpublished memoranda as they become more politicized.

Table 1

|	Executive Orders		Published Memos		Unpublished Memos	
	Dependent variable:					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
New Head	−0.163**	−0.134	−0.084	−0.195	−0.346**	−0.628***
	(0.071)	(0.091)	(0.161)	(0.204)	(0.136)	(0.178)
New Head:Ideological Opp.		−0.063		0.392		0.698***
		(0.138)		(0.321)		(0.266)
Vacancy Length	−0.0002	0.0004	0.00003	0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Vacancy Length:Ideological Opp.		−0.002*		−0.009***		−0.005**
		(0.001)		(0.003)		(0.002)
Politicization	0.845***	0.329	2.169***	1.768***	0.632	0.829
	(0.262)	(0.324)	(0.583)	(0.676)	(0.463)	(0.505)
Politicization:Ideological Opp.		1.414***		1.162		−0.725
		(0.521)		(1.161)		(1.099)
Ideological Opp.	0.114*	0.085	0.019	−0.013	−0.011	−0.051
	(0.063)	(0.082)	(0.144)	(0.189)	(0.114)	(0.146)
Cabinet	0.768***	0.768***	1.309***	1.215***	1.218***	1.165***
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.208)	(0.206)	(0.168)	(0.169)
Senate Opp.	−0.201**	−0.213***	−0.028	−0.045	0.406***	0.400***
	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.178)	(0.175)	(0.138)	(0.137)
Constant	0.529***	0.539***	−1.543***	−1.449***	−1.537***	−1.462***
	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.268)	(0.267)	(0.220)	(0.218)
President Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	549	549	549	549	549	549

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The broad takeaways from Table 1 are that the ideological leaning of an agency is a key determinant for whether a president will direct unilateral actions to an agency, specifically as the length of vacancies varies. Unilateral actions provide the president with an opportunity to centralize decision making in ideologically opposed agencies, but presidents will only feel confident in his ability to effectively centralize when these agencies are highly politicized. Further, when considering politicization apart from vacancies, politicization does matter for whether a president will direct unilateral actions to an agency, specifically for executive orders and published memoranda. The relationship between politicization and the likelihood a president will direct an unpublished memoranda to an agency is not significant. This trend might not hold for unpublished memoranda as unpublished memoranda are do not pose the same costs for presidents. Executive orders and published memoranda go through internal review process. Further, their publication in the *Federal Register* might make them more likely to face sanctioning from actors outside the executive branch. Unpublished memoranda do not face these same costs, so presidents might be less strategic in their use of unpublished memoranda as they are not as concerned with the cost of them.

Figure 1 shows the relationship between the length of a vacancy and the predicted number of published memoranda directed to ideologically opposed or aligned agencies. As the length of a vacancy increases, the president will direct fewer memoranda to ideologically opposed agencies and slighly more to aligned or moderate agencies. Thus, vacancies are a determinant for presidents looking to direct agencies via unilateral action.

Figure 2 shows the relationship between executive orders and politicization. In this case, as the agency becomes more politicized, presidents will direct more executive orders to the agency. This is especially true for ideologically opposed agencies compared to ideological aligned or moderate agencies. Both Figure 1 and 2 demonstrate the same trend. Presidents will direct more unilateral actions to agencies where he has more control over the composition of the agency, especially for ideologically opposed agencies.

Figure 1 – Predicted Level of Published Memoranda Given Vacancy Length and Agency Ideology (Model 4 of Table 1)

Figure 2 – Predicted Level of Executive Orders Given Politicization Percentage and Agency Ideology (Model 2 of Table 1)

5   Conclusion

This paper describes how an agency's political composition will affect the president's decision to use unilateral action. The results indicate that presidents direct more unilateral action towards agencies where they have heightened level of political control through the placement of appointees. However, when ideologically opposed agencies have fewer appointees and more vacancies, presidents become less likely to issue directives.

Several implications emerge from this analysis. First, theories of unilateral action must account for constraints placed on presidents due to internal agency dynamics. Unilateral action requires bureaucratic implementation. Therefore, presidents need either a receptive, ideologically aligned civil service or an appointee team to ensure compliance. More broadly, this suggests that research on the administrative presidency, and particularly presidential centralization, must account for the presence of appointees. Rather than centralization and politicization operating as substitutes, they are mutually reinforcing. Finally, the increasing prevalence of vacancies has broad consequences for the president's ability to set and implement policy. Without a functioning appointments process, presidents may face increasing constraints on how they can use other forms of executive power.

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Appendix

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Table 2 – Cabinet Subset

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	Executive Orders		Published Memos		Unpublished Memos	
			Dependent variable:			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
New Head	−0.255***	−0.210**	−0.036	−0.190	−0.477***	−0.800***
	(0.080)	(0.099)	(0.184)	(0.231)	(0.145)	(0.193)
New Head:Ideological Opp.		0.034		0.612		0.789***
		(0.160)		(0.374)		(0.284)
Vacancy Length	0.001	0.002**	0.001	0.002	0.003**	0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Vacancy Length:Ideological Opp.		−0.008***		−0.013**		−0.006*
		(0.002)		(0.006)		(0.003)
Politicization	−0.578	−0.623	1.056	−0.771	−0.990	−0.537
	(0.421)	(0.475)	(0.833)	(1.117)	(0.708)	(0.707)
Politicization:Ideological Opp.		0.204		7.431***		−3.891
		(1.116)		(2.443)		(2.407)
Ideological Opp.	0.086	0.159*	0.077	−0.297	−0.0002	0.014
	(0.068)	(0.091)	(0.161)	(0.219)	(0.119)	(0.157)
Senate Opp.	−0.264***	−0.252***	0.006	0.027	0.287**	0.292**
	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.200)	(0.197)	(0.145)	(0.144)
Constant	1.436***	1.395***	−0.304	−0.371*	−0.204	−0.128
	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.208)	(0.216)	(0.159)	(0.159)
President Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	409	409	409	409	409	409

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3 – OPM Measure of Politicization Subset (1998-2020)

	Executive Orders		Published Memos		Unpublished Memos	
	Dependent variable:					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
New Head	−0.227***	−0.191*	−0.180	−0.248	−0.227	−0.461**
	(0.078)	(0.102)	(0.183)	(0.236)	(0.150)	(0.203)
New Head:Ideological Opp.		−0.057		0.318		0.586**
		(0.151)		(0.368)		(0.295)
Vacancy Length	0.0002	0.001	0.0004	0.002	0.001	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Vacancy Length:Ideological Opp.		−0.002*		−0.010***		−0.007**
		(0.001)		(0.004)		(0.003)
Politicization	1.284***	0.847*	3.411***	3.241***	1.332*	2.274***
	(0.351)	(0.466)	(0.817)	(1.023)	(0.683)	(0.763)
Politicization:Ideological Opp.		0.926		0.525		−3.083**
		(0.635)		(1.427)		(1.417)
Ideological Opp.	0.099	0.105	−0.015	0.050	−0.083	0.067
	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.160)	(0.212)	(0.120)	(0.156)
Cabinet	0.823***	0.787***	1.446***	1.308***	1.335***	1.264***
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.252)	(0.247)	(0.193)	(0.189)
Senate Opp.	−0.234**	−0.243***	−0.110	−0.148	0.064	0.046
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.214)	(0.211)	(0.176)	(0.174)
Constant	0.488***	0.518***	−1.695***	−1.599***	−1.533***	−1.492***
	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.314)	(0.313)	(0.244)	(0.238)
President Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	454	454	454	454	454	454

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4 – President and Agency Fixed Effects

	Dependent variable:					
	EO		PM		UP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
New Head	−0.242***	−0.178***	−0.222*	−0.326**	−0.418***	−0.657***
	(0.053)	(0.068)	(0.114)	(0.145)	(0.130)	(0.171)
New Head:Ideological Opp.		−0.135		0.287		0.522**
		(0.102)		(0.220)		(0.251)
Vacancy Length	0.0004	0.001*	0.001	0.003***	0.001	0.001
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Vacancy Length:Ideological Opp.		−0.002*		−0.006**		−0.001
		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Politicization	0.083	0.064	0.137	0.226	0.669	0.609
	(0.431)	(0.433)	(1.202)	(1.189)	(0.787)	(0.792)
Politicization:Ideological Opp.		0.526		−0.117		−2.735**
		(0.430)		(0.943)		(1.146)
Ideological Opp.	0.045	0.082	−0.234**	−0.204	−0.150	−0.104
	(0.050)	(0.063)	(0.107)	(0.141)	(0.117)	(0.148)
Senate Opp.	−0.232***	−0.233***	−0.040	−0.055	0.431***	0.402***
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.133)	(0.132)
Constant	1.705***	1.666***	−0.320	−0.316	−0.414*	−0.345
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.235)	(0.234)	(0.241)	(0.241)
President Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Agency Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	549	549	549	549	549	549

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01